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COMMENTS
APPLICATION OF DRAM SHOP ACTS TO NoN-COMMERCIAL
SUPPLIERS OF LIQUOR
Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W. 2d 149 (1972)
Defendant purchased liquor for his minor brother, who consumed
the liquor and was killed in an automobile accident caused by his
intoxication. Decedent's parents and decedent's son successfully sued
under Minnesota's dram shop act, the Minnesota Civil Damage Act.'
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, defendant contended that
he was not a proper defendant under the Civil Damage Act because
he was not a commercial seller of liquor. Held: Persons not in the
business of selling intoxicating liquor are liable under the Minnesota
Civil Damage Act for damages caused by their illegal2 furnishing of
1. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 340.95 (1972):
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is
injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person,
or by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name,
against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating li-
quors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages sustained; and all
damages recovered by a minor under this section shall be paid either to such
minor or to his parent, guardian, or next friend, as the court directs; and all
suits for damages under this section shall be by civil action in any court of this
state having jurisdiction thereof.
2. The illegal transfers governed by Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149
(1972), are specified in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 340.73 (1972):
Subdivision 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, except a licensed pharma-
cist to sell, give, barter, furnish, deliver, or dispose of, in any manner, either di-
rectly or indirectly, any spirituous, vinous, malt, or fermented liquors in any
quantity, for any purpose, whatever, to any minor person, or to any intoxicated
person, or to any public prostitute.
Subdivision 2. It shall be unlawful for any person except a licensed pharmacist
to sell, give, barter, furnish or dispose of, in any manner, either directly or in-
directly, any spirituous, vinous, malt or fermented liquors in any quantity, for
any purpose, whatever, to any spendthrift, habitual drunkard, or improvident
person, within one year after written notice by any peace officer, parent, guard-
ian, master, employer, relative, or by any person annoyed or injured by the in-
toxication of such spendthrift, habitual drunkard, or improvident person, for-
bidding the sale of liquor to any such spendthrift, habitual drunkard, or im-
provident person.
Subdivision 3. Whoever shall in any way procure liquor for the use of any
person named in this section shall be deemed to have sold it to such person.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 340.79 (1972) states:
Any person who shall give to, procure or purchase, intoxicating liquors for any
minor person or other person to whom the sale of intoxicating liquors is by law
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liquor.'
At common law, one who sold or furnished liquor to an able-
bodied individual could not be held liable for damages resulting from
the consumer's intoxication.' Legislatures, responding to pressure from
the temperance movement, created this liability by enacting dram shop
laws.' Most dram shop acts currently in force provide a potentially
broad base for liability by permitting "any person!' to recover for
damages to his "person, property, or means of support."6 Moreover,
the defendant's actions need not be the sole cause of the consumer's
intoxication, but need only contribute to it.7  Liability usually is lim-
ited, however, by the requirement that the liquor be illegally given or
sold,8 and a few states expressly limit liability to those who sell liquor.9
forbidden, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be pun-
ished in accordance with the laws of the state.
Other illegal transfers of liquor are described in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 340.78, 340.83
(1972).
3. Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
4. E.g., Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945); Carr v. Turner,
238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450
(1955); FIeckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Hull v.
Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374 P.2d 351 (1962); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 1M. 211, 83 N.E.2d
708 (1949); Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Cowman v. Hansen, 250
Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958); Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 144
S.W.2d 746 (1940). See also 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 645; Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 833
(1961). But see Colligan v. Cousar, 38 IlL. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Rap-
paport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
5. See D. COLVIN, PROHmTON IN Tim UNTED STATES 25-27 (1926); JACKSON-
BABBIT, INC., THE NEW CRUSADE 4-27 (1932); Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of the
Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 175, 176-77.
6. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 121 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1973); IowA CODE ANN. § 123.93 (Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.993 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.95 (1972); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1964); Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Anderson 1965); R.L GEN. LAws ANN. § 3-11-1 (1956); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
7. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 123.93 (Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 18.993 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1964);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Anderson 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501
(1972).
8. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 121 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 716 (1953); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.993 (Supp. 1973);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1964);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Anderson 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-11-1
(1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
9. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 30-102 (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 716 (1953);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.93 (Supp. 1973).
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Although the motivating force behind the enactment of dram shop
laws was the public's desire to discourage the sale of liquor,10 courts
have disagreed whether the purpose of the acts is to compensate the
injured person"l or to penalize the liquor supplier. 2 Many courts
have tried to effectuate both purposes by construing the acts as at-
tempts both to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief.' 3
Whatever the objective attributed to dram shop acts, courts have lim-
ited liability thereunder by allowing set-offs for damages recovered
under another theory14 and by denying recovery of damages for pain
10. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957); Roberts
v. Casey, 4 Conn. Cir. 89, 225 A.2d 836 (1966); Walker v. Service Liquor Store, Inc.,
120 Ill. App. 2d 112, 255 N.E.2d 613 (1970); Geocaris v. Bangs, 91 Ill. App. 2d 81, 234
N.E.2d 17 (1968); LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712 (1967);
Herbes v. Village of Holdingford, 267 Minn. 75, 125 N.W.2d 426 (1963); Schmidt
v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Adamson v. Dougherty,
248 Minn. 535, 81 N.W.2d 110 (1957).
12. See, e.g., Moran v. Katsinas, 16 IlM. 2d 169, 157 N.E.2d 38 (1959); Wessel v.
Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. App. 1971); Coffey v. ABC Liquor
Stores, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 2d 510, 142 N.E.2d 705 (1957); Lichter v. Scher, 11 11. App.
2d 441, 138 N.E.2d 66 (1956); Robertson v. White, 11 IIl. App. 2d 177, 136 N.E.2d
550 (1956); Hyba v. Homeman, 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564 (1939); Hartwig v.
Moose Lodge 1246, 253 Minn. 347, 91 N.W.2d 794 (1958); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn.
28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Playford v. Perich, 2 Misc. 2d 170, 152 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sup.
Ct. 1956).
13. See, e.g., Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir.
1961); Lester v. Bugni, 316 IMI. App. 19, 44 N.E.2d 68 (1942); Williams v. Klemes-
tad, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972); Wendelin v. Russell, 259 Iowa 1152, 147 N.W.2d
188 (1966); Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254 (1953); Iszler
v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1957).
14. See, e.g., Laznovsky v. Furdanowicz, 22 Conn. Supp. 297, 170 A.2d 734 (Sup.
Ct. 1961) (plaintiff's settlement of cause of action against intoxicated motorist was
good defense for barkeeper in dram shop action); Kurth v. Amee, Inc., 3 Ill. App. 3d
506, 278 N.E.2d 162 (1972) (proper procedure for assessing damages in action under
dram shop act is to determine the total damages and then reduce them by amount re-
ceived in return for covenant not to sue); Shiflett v. Madison, 105 Ill. App. 2d 382,
245 N.E.2d 567 (1969) (trial court erred in framing instructions to jury so that plain-
tiff might recover his lost income in an action in his name and in action brought by
him for the benefit of his wife); Larabell v. Schuknecht, 308 Mich. 419, 14 N.W.2d
50 (1944) (defendant tavern keeper entitled to mitigate damages by amount paid
plaintiff for covenant not to sue tavern proprietors who had also served person causing
the injury); Ritter v. Village of Appleton, 254 Minn. 30, 93 N.W.2d 683 (1958)
(compromise and settlement under wrongful death act and releases discharging auto-
mobile drivers did not bar actions under the Civil Damage Act, but defendant is
entitled to diminish recovery against him by amounts otherwise received); Hartwig
v. Moose Lodge 1246, 253 Minn. 347, 91 N.W.2d 794 (1958) (trial court committed
reversible error in not allowing defendants to show prior recovery of damages in wrong-
ful death act). But see Playford v. Perich, 2 Misc. 2d 170, 152 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sup.
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and suffering. 1' Some courts have emphasized the penal aspects of
dram shop acts by allowing recovery of exemplary damages" and by
denying defendants the opportunity to recover from the intoxicated
person.1
7
The scope and impact of most dram shop acts has been limited by
judicial decisions. Thus, courts have refused recovery when an in-
toxicated person has injured himself, even though dram shop acts do
not expressly preclude such recovery.' Recovery also has been de-
nied when the plaintiff has participated in the drinking activities of
the person whose act produced the injury,'" as well as when the
Ct. 1956) (recovery under wrongful death statute does not diminish liability under
dram shop provision).
15. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 111. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Brantigam v. While,
73 I11. 561 (1874); Robertson v. White, 11 M1. App. 2d 177, 136 N.E.2d 550 (1956);
Jackson v. Noble, 54 Iowa 641, 7 N.W. 88 (1880); Calloway v. Laydon, 47 Iowa 456
(1877); Barton v. Benedict, 39 Mich. App. 517, 197 N.W.2d 898 (1972); State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963); Mulford v.
Clewell, 21 Ohio St. 191 (1871); Pennington v. Gillaspie, 66 W. Va. 643, 66 S.E.
1009 (1910); Duckworth v. Stalnaker, 68 W. Va. 197, 69 S.E. 850 (1910) (dic-
tum). But cf. League v. Ehmke, 120 Iowa 464, 94 N.W. 938 (1903).
16. Hyba v. Horneman, 302 111. App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564 (1939); Campbell v.
Harmon, 96 Me. 87, 51 A. 801 (1901); Barton v. Benedict, 39 Mich. App. 517, 197
N.W.2d 898 (1972); Butler v. Kajfes, 16 Mich. App. 190, 167 N.W.2d 796 (1969);
Marrone v. Di Castro, 189 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1959); Duckworth v. Stalnaker, 68 W. Va.
197, 69 S.E. 850 (1910); Pennington v. Gillaspie, 66 W. Va. 643, 66 S.E. 1009 (1910).
17. The Illinois appellate courts are split over whether the defendant dram shop
keeper should be able to implead or seek indemnification from the intoxicated person
responsible for the injury. Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 416 (IM.
App. 1971), and Coffey v. ABC Liquor Stores, 13 Ill. App. 2d 510, 142 N.E.2d 705
(1957), emphasize that indemnification permits a possible evasion of penal liability.
Cf. Barton v. Benedict, 39 Mich. App. 517, 197 N.W.2d 898 (1972). The courts in
Walker v. Service Liquor Store, Inc., 120 Ill. App. 2d 112, 255 N.E.2d 613 (1970), and
Geocaris v. Bangs, 91 Ill. App. 2d 81, 234 N.E.2d 17 (1968), would permit indemnity
since it does not diminish the remedy afforded by the statute; ci. Farmers Ins. Exch.
v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143 N.W.2d 230 (1966).
18. See, e.g., Kreps v. D'Agostine, 329 Ill. App. 190, 67 N.E.2d 416 (1946);
Holmes v. Rolando, 320 I11. App. 475, 51 N.E.2d 786 (1943); Bennett v. Auditorium
Building Corp., 299 Il. App. 139, 19 N.E.2d 626 (1939); Malone v. Lambrecht, 305
Mich. 58, 8 N.W.2d 910 (1943); Brooks v. Cook, 44 Mich. 617, 7 N.W. 216 (1880);
Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395, 181 N.W.2d 692 (1970); Empire Fire
Ins. Co. v. Williams, 265 Minn. 333, 121 N.W.2d 580 (1963) (dictum); Randall v. Vil-
lage of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131 (1960); Bizzell v. N.E.F.S. Rest., Inc.,
275 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1966); cf. Evans v. Kennedy, 162 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa
1968). But cf. Playford v. Perich, 2 Misc. 2d 170, 152 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
19. See, e.g., Cookinham v. Sullivan, 23 Conn. Supp. 193, 179 A.2d 840 (Sup. Ct.
1962); Holcomb v. Hornback, 51 111. App. 2d 84, 200 N.E.2d 745 (1964); Guardado
v. Navarro, 47 Ill. App. 2d 92, 197 N.E.2d 469 (1964); Baker v. Hannan, 44 111.
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liquor has been consumed off the supplier's premises by a person
other than the purchaser.20  At least one jurisdiction has refused re-
covery to plaintiffs who incurred damages outside the state in which
the person causing the damages had purchased and consumed liquor. 1
Moreover, courts in a few jurisdictions have limited liability to vendors
of liquor, although the dram shop acts in these jurisdictions are not
so limited.22
App. 2d 157, 194 N.E.2d 563 (1963); Osinger v. Christian, 43 Ill. App. 2d 480,
193 N.E.2d 872 (1963); Burnley v. Moore, 41 Ill. App. 2d 156, 190 N.E.2d 141 (1963);
Tezak v. Cooper, 24 IMI. App. 2d 356, 164 N.E.2d 493 (1960); Meier v. Pocius, 17
Ill. App. 2d 332, 150 N.E.2d 215 (1958); Krotzer v. Drinka, 344 Ill. App. 256, 100
N.E.2d 518 (1951); James v. Wicker, 309 Ill. App. 397, 33 N.E.2d 169 (1941); Kangas
v. Suchorski, 372 Mich. 396, 126 N.W.2d 803 (1964); Turk v. Long Branch Saloon,
Inc., 280 Minn. 438, 159 N.W.2d 903 (1968); cf. Busser v. Noble, 22 Ill. App. 2d
433, 161 N.E.2d 150 (1959); Taylor v. Hughes, 17 Ill. App. 2d 138, 149 N.E.2d 393
(1958); DeLong v. Whitehead, 11 Ill. App. 2d 330, 137 N.E.2d 276 (1956). But see
Lester v. Bugni, 316 Ill. App. 2d 19, 44 N.E.2d 68 (1942).
Courts differ as to the degree of participation in the drinking activities of the per-
son who causes the harm that will preclude a plaintiff from recovering. See Reget v.
Bell, 77 Ill. 593 (1875); Holcomb v. Hornback, 51 ill. App. 2d 84, 200 N.E.2d 745
(1964); Forsberg v. Around Town Club, 316 In. App. 661, 45 N.E.2d 513 (1942);
James v. Wicker, 309 IIl. App. 397, 33 N.E.2d 169 (1941); Berge v. Harris, 170
N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 1966); Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton Corp., 283 Minn. 1, 166
N.W.2d 95 (1969); Mitchells v. The Shoals, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 338, 227 N.E.2d 21 (1967).
20. Anderson v. Dale, 90 In. App. 2d 332, 232 N.E.2d 767 (1968); Rittmeyer v.
Anderson, 49 III. App. 2d 71, 199 N.E.2d 463 (1964); McCoy v. Spalding, 41 In. App.
2d 292, 190 N.E.2d 483 (1963); Stinson v. Edlen, 27 Iln. App. 2d 425, 169 N.E.2d
682 (1960); Blackwell v. Fernandez, 324 In. App. 597, 59 N.E.2d 342 (1945); Mal-
donado v. Claud's, Inc., 347 Mich. 395, 79 N.W.2d 847 (1956); West v. Leiphart
& Co., 169 Mich. 354, 135 N.W. 246 (1912); Fladeland v. Mayer, 102 N.W.2d 121
(N.D. 1960). But see Bell v. Poindexter, 336 Ill. App. 541, 84 N.E.2d 646 (1949);
Meyer v. State Line Super Mart, 1 Mich. App. 562, 137 N.W.2d 299 (1965). In both
cases a cause of action was granted under the dram shop act if the complaint alleged
that the tavern keeper sold liquor with knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe
that liquor would be consumed by minors.
21. Graham v. V.F.W. Post 2665, 97 Iln. App. 2d 139, 239 N.E.2d 856 (1968),
affld, 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969); Butler v. Wittland, 18 Ill. App. 2d 578,
153 N.E.2d 106 (1958); Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Il. App. 151, 95
N.E.2d 512 (1950).
22. Cruse v. Aden, 127 II. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass
Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964); Harris v. Hardesty, 111 Kan. 291,
207 P. 188 (1922); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d 303 (1970);
LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712 (1967). But see Williams v.
Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972); Currier v. McKee, 99 Me. 364, 59 A. 442
(1904) (dictum). Cases similar to Williams will no longer arise because the present
law, IowA CODE ANN. § 123.9 (Supp. 1973), limits liability to "any licensees or per-
mittees." In Peterson v. Brackey, 143 Iowa 75, 119 N.W. 967 (1909), a farm cou-
ple who furnished liquor to another couple while they were discussing a hog trade was
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In contrast to the decisions in most states, Minnesota courts usually
construe the state's dram shop act to permit recovery by the plain-
tiff.2  Thus, Minnesota courts have allowed recovery when the
liquor was purchased in Minnesota and the injury occurred out-
side the state; 24 when the vendor was a municipal corporation; 25 when
held liable for the death of one of the consumers under Law of March 20, 1862, ch.
47, § 2, [1862] Iowa Acts 50 (now IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.9 (Supp. 1973)). The
statute provided for a right of action against "any person who shall, by selling in-
toxicating liquors cause the intoxication of such person . . . ." The court did not
consider, however, the question whether the defendants were proper defendants un-
der the statute.
Dicta in Minnesota cases prior to Ross suggested that Minnesota courts might hold
non-vendors of liquor liable under the Civil Damage Act. Heveron v. Village of
Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395, 181 N.W.2d 692 (1970); Dahlin v. Kron, 232 Minn. 312,
45 N.W.2d 833 (1950).
The courts that have limited liability to vendors of liquor usually have based their
decisions on the perceived intent of the legislature as evidenced by the statutory setting
of the particular dram shop act in question. In Harris v. Hardesty, 111 Kan. 291, 207
P. 188 (1922), the court's interpretation of the act, Law of May 1, 1881, ch. 128, § 15,
Kan. Laws (repealed 1949), depended upon the title of the original dram shop act, Law
of March 3, 1868, ch. 35, Kan. Gen. Stat.: "An act to restrain dranshops and
taverns, and to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquor." Accord, Cruse v. Aden, 127
Il1. 231. 20 N.E. 73 (1889); State v. Barrett, 27 Kan. 213 (1882).
In Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 ]M. App. 2d 412, 422-23, 199 N.E.2d 300,
306 (1964), the court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to include social
suppliers of liquor because to do so "would open the floodgates of litigation as to al-
most every happening where someone was injured." Liability under the Illinois stat-
ute does not depend upon an illegal transfer.
The Michigan decisions purport to rely on the "general rule" that dram shop acts
are not directed at non-vendors of liquor. Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219,
175 N.W.2d 303 (1970); LeGault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712
(1967). The statutory scheme of the Michigan act suggests that this limitation on lia-
bility accords with the intent of the legislature. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.993 (Supp.
1973) is apparently directed at commercial vendors of liquor. It provides for the post-
ing of a bond as a condition precedent to obtaining a license, prescribes the form for
the bond, and contains a provision for civil liability similar to the Minnesota Civil
Damage Act that includes principals and sureties on the bond as possible defendants.
Furthermore, the courts in Harris, Cruse, and Miller held that provisions that extend
liability under the dram shop act to persons who "give" liquor are directed at vendors
who attempt to avoid the consequences of the act by claiming they gave, not sold,
liquor.
23. Note, Liability Under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, 46 MINN. L. REV. 169,
174-75 (1962).
24. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
25. Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254 (1953). Numerous
suits have been brought against municipalities. E.g., Cameron v. City of Fridley, 293
Minn. 110, 197 N.W.2d 233 (1972); Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395,
181 N.W.2d 692 (1970); Trail v. Village of Elk River, 286 Minn. 380, 175 N.W.2d 916
(1970).
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the person who sold or served the liquor failed to take affirmative steps
to ascertain whether the consumer was intoxicated before serving him;20
and when the person who purchased the liquor transferred it to another
who caused the harm. Furthermore, Minnesota courts, apparently
unconcerned with penalizing the supplier of liquor, have given the
supplier the right of indemnification against the intoxicated person.=8
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court in Ross ostensibly based
its holding on a legislative intent to impose liability on persons who
merely furnish liquor and who are not engaged in its sale, the decision
probably represents an extension of the court's own policy of com-
pensating an individual injured because of the intoxication of another.
The Civil Damage Act, in its statutory context, gives little indication
whether the legislature intended to impose liability on non-commer-
cial suppliers of liquor. Furthermore, if section 340.951 of the Min-
nesota Statutes,29 which describes the notice requirements for actions
26. See Cameron v. City of Fridley, 293 Minn. 110, 197 N.W.2d 233 (1972); Kluger
v. Gallett, 288 Minn. 11, 178 N.W.2d 900 (1970); Mjos v. Village of Howard Lake, 287
Minn. 427, 178 N.W.2d 862 (1970).
In 1969 the legislature amended Law of April 25, 1949, ch. 654, § 3, [1949] Minn.
Laws 1167, by deleting a clause that made liquor sales to minors, habitual drunkards,
or obviously intoxicated persons illegal. MmNN. STAT. ANN. § 340.73 (1972), which
made sales to an intoxicated person, rather than an "obviously" intoxicated person,
illegal, was in effect at that time. In 1971 the legislature added a new provision to
Law of April 25, 1949, ch. 654, § 3, [1949] Minn. Laws 1167:
Persons denied access. No intoxicating liquor shall be sold, furnished, or de-
livered for any purpose to any minor or to any person obviously intoxicated or
to any of the persons to whom sale is prohibited by statute.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.14(1) (a) (1972).
This provision in essence reflects both standards of intoxication. While the provi-
sion expressly adopts the "obviously intoxicated" standard that had been deleted in
1969, the reference in the last phrase--"prohibited by statute"--to MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.73 (1972), necessarily incorporates the simple "intoxicated" standard of that
statute.
27. See Trail v. Village of Elk River, 286 Minn. 380, 175 N.W.2d 916 (1970);
Kvanli v. Village of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 139 N.W.2d 275 (1965); Murphy v. Hen-
nen, 264 Minn. 457, 119 N.W.2d 489 (1963); accord, Judge v. Jordan, 81 Iowa 519,
46 N.W. 1077 (1890).
28. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 658 (1968); Farmers
Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143 N.W.2d 230 (1966). The courts
thus have recognized that indemnification does not affect the injured person's com-
pensation.
29. MImN. STAT. ANN. § 340.951 (1972):
From and after July 1, 1969, every person who claims damages from any mu-
nicipality owning and operating a municipal liquor store or from the licensee of
any licensed liquor establishment for or on account of any injury within the
scope of Minnesota Statutes, Section 340.95, shall give a written notice to the
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brought under the Civil Damage Act, were intended to be coextensive
with the Civil Damage Act, then the Ross decision is contrary to leg-
islative intent because section 340.951 applies only to municipal and
licensed private liquor establishments.
The court in Ross chose to maximize the possibility of recovery in
situations where injury is caused by the illegal supplying of liquor.3 0
Although the application of the Civil Damage Act to Ross-type situa-
tions may fall short of its compensatory goal because of the financial
inadequacy of the social supplier of liquor,3' the injured person, nev-
ertheless, is at least assured of a cause of action.
Since the statutory requirement that liquor be illegally transferred
now is satisfied merely by serving liquor to an intoxicated person or
a minor, Ross suggests the possibility of recovery under the dram
shop act every time liquor is served and injury results. Whether
Ross actually will deter persons from serving liquor to minors and
intoxicated persons will depend upon whether social suppliers of liquor
are aware of their possible liability and whether they would be willing
to risk such liability.33
governing body of the municipality or the licensee of the liquor establishment,
as the case may be ..
30. Absent a statute, or in addition to a statute, a court might recognize a common
law duty not to serve liquor when it would be unreasonable to do so. Wiener v.
Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Ore. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
But see Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970).
31. Although the burden on the supplier may be passed on through indemnifica-
tion, see note 28 supra and accompanying text, this still may not adequately satisfy the
compensatory objective of the Ross decision.
Arguably, liability should be restricted to the liquor industry, which not only profits
from the sale of liquor, but can bear the burden more easily than a private individual.
Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 125, 200 N.W.2d 149, 155 (1972) (Rogosheske, J., con-
curring specially); Note, Liability Under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, 46 MnqN. L.
REv. 169, 185 (1961).
32. The court in Ross distinguished Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 IM.
App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964), and the Illinois statute, because under the Illinois
statute liability does not require an illegal transfer. 294 Minn. at 120, 200 N.W.2d at
152. But as long as an illegal transfer includes giving liquor to an intoxicated per-
son, and since one is required to take affirmative steps to ascertain whether an indi-
vidual is intoxicated, see note 26 supra and accompanying text, the scope of the Minne-
sota statute will in effect be almost as broad as the Illinois statute.
33. The deterrent effect of dram shop acts on the liquor industry, as opposed to
social suppliers of liquor, probably is slight because most vendors carry insurance.
Note, Liability Under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, 46 MiNN. L. REv. 169, 176-77
(1961).
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